



When Perimeter Defenses Are Compromised

Applying Zero Trust Concepts to Achieve Cyber Defense-In-Depth



The Current Landscape...

Today's systems are very brittle, rely on a one-dimensional protection strategy of penetration resistance, and are highly susceptible to devastating cyber-attacks.







Exfiltrate information. Preposition malicious code. Bring down capability. Create deception.












The Problem...

A one-dimensional protection strategy of penetration resistance and perimeter defense is inadequate – especially for critical systems and high value assets.








The Solution...

Adopt a multi-dimensional protection strategy that includes developing damage limiting system architectures and cyber resilient systems.





Reducing susceptibility to *cyber threats* requires a multidimensional strategy.









Damage Limitation...

In Time—

- Virtualization and micro virtualization
- Limits "time on target" for adversaries

In Space—

- Zero trust architectures
- Domain separation
- Network segmentation / micro segmentation
- Impedes "lateral movement" of adversaries



Zero Trust...

A collection of concepts designed to reduce the uncertainty in enforcing accurate, perrequest access decisions in information systems and services with the assumption that the system or network is *compromised*.



Zero Trust Architecture...

An enterprise's security plan that employs zero trust concepts and includes component relationships, workflow planning, and access policies.





PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

DATA AND COMPUTING SERVICES ARE CONSIDERED RESOURCES

A network may be composed of many different classes of devices including devices with a small form factor that send data to aggregators or storage; software as a service (SaaS); systems sending instructions to actuators, and other functions.





PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY

ALL COMMUNICATIONS ARE SECURED REGARDLESS OF NETWORK LOCATION

Network location does not imply trust. Access requests from resources located on an enterprise-owned network (e.g., inside a traditional network perimeter) must meet the same security requirements as access requests from any other nonenterprise-owned network.





PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES IS GRANTED ON A PER-SESSION BASIS

Trust in the requester is evaluated before the access is granted. This could mean only "sometime previously" for a particular transaction and may not occur directly before initiating a session or performing a transaction with a resource.

Authentication and authorization to one resource does not automatically grant access to a different resource.





PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY

ACCESS TO RESOURCES IS DETERMINED BY DYNAMIC POLICY

The dynamic policy includes the observable state of client identity, application, and the requesting asset, and may include other behavioral attributes.





PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

ENTERPRISE-OWNED AND ASSOCIATED DEVICES ARE IN THE MOST SECURE STATE POSSIBLE

The security of devices is driven by mission or business requirements.

Enterprises continuously monitor devices to ensure those devices maintain their security posture.





Zero Trust Concepts

SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY

RESOURCE AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION ARE DYNAMIC AND STRICTLY ENFORCED — BEFORE ACCESS IS ALLOWED

Constant cycle of obtaining access, scanning and assessing threats, adapting, and continually reevaluating trust in ongoing communications.

Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) and asset management systems are expected capabilities for an enterprise.





Zero Trust Concepts

SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

THE SECURITY POSTURE OF THE ENTERPRISE IS CONTINUOUSLY IMPROVED BY MONITORING THE STATE OF THE NETWORK AND COMMUNICATIONS

An enterprise collects data about network traffic and access requests, which is then used to improve policy creation and enforcement.

Data can also be used to provide context for access requests.



Zero Trust Architecture in the System Life Cycle



- Business or mission analysis
- Stakeholder needs and requirements definition
 - System requirements definition
 - Architecture definition
 - Design definition
 - System analysis
 - Implementation
 - Integration
 - Verification
 - Transition
 - Validation
 - Operation
- Maintenance
- Disposal







NIST Special Publication 800-207

Zero Trust Architecture

Second Public Draft

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207-draft2







NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1

Systems Systems Security Engineering

Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v1







NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 2

Developing Cyber Resilient Systems

A Systems Security Engineering Approach

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v2







Zero Trust Architecture Project

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/zero-trust-architecture zta-nccoe@nist.gov

Systems Security Engineering Project

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